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Dmitry Vlasov1
Sobolev Institute of Mathematics, SB RAS vlasov@math.nsc.ru ⋆⋆
Abstract. Russell is a logical framework for the specification and imple-
mentation of deductive systems. It is a high-level language with respect
to Metamath language [7], so inherently it uses a Metamath foundations,
i.e. it doesn’t rely on any particular formal calculus, but rather is a pure
logical framework. The main difference with Metamath is in the proof
language and approach to syntax: the proofs have a declarative form, i.e.
consist of actual expressions, which are used in proofs, while syntactic
grammar rules are separated from the meaningful rules of inference.
Russell is implemented in c++14 and is distributed under GPL v3 li-
cense. The repository contains translators from Metamath to Russell
and back. Original Metamath theorem base (almost 30 000 theorems)
can be translated to Russell, verified, translated back to Metamath and
verified with the original Metamath verifier. Russell can be downloaded
from the repository https://github.com/dmitry-vlasov/russell
1 Introduction
Recently the ambitious QED project [2] has celebrated its 20 year anniversary,
while the claimed goals of this project are still far from being reached. Several
papers [10], [9], [4], [6], [3] addressing the history of QED clearly state that yet
there is no computer language, which has all the expected features of a QED
system. Summarizing these papers, it can be said that the major barriers of
QED are:
– the ’Balcanization’ of QED-like systems, i.e. when there are different lan-
guages with different foundations and there is no simple way to share for-
malized proofs between them [6]
– the lack of a powerful automation, which could seriously reduce end user
efforts to prove a theorem [4]
– the difference between the standard practical mathematical language, which
is used in papers and textbooks, and the formal language of QED-like sys-
tems [9]
Russell is another system, which is intended to reach QED goals. It was developed
to address all these obstacles, and some of them are to some extent removed in
the Russell design.
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22 The Russell System
The Russell system is a general purpose framework for definition and usage of
different formal deductive systems. The variety of formal systems, which can
be represented in Russell, is quite wide, although limited. For example, non-
monotonic deductive systems cannot be given in Russell. As a high-level lan-
guage wrt Metamath [7], Russell inherits its foundations, which are close to the
notion of Post’s canonical system [8]. The approach of Metamath to syntax of
expressions is more general than that of Russell: syntactic rules in Metamath are
indistinguishable from the meaningful rules of inference and can have meaningful
(essential, in Metamath terms) premises. In Russell, the grammar of expressions
must be context free by the language definition. In all other aspects Metamath
and Russell share the same foundations.
2.1 Pure Logical Framework
What distinguishes Metamath and Russell from other logical frameworks is pu-
rity: their deduction engines don’t use any built-in logic (in the form of axioms
and inference rules). The deduction used in Metamath and Russell is concerned
with making a proper substitution, applying it to a certain expression and check-
ing the coincidence of the result with some other expression. From the very gen-
eral point of view, such logic-neutrality is a good property, because we want to
avoid the situation when some formal deductive system has an a-priory better
fitness to the language than the other because of the propinquity with the under-
lying logic of a logical framework. Similar arguments are mentioned in the paper
[6], where the statement of foundational pluralism is given. In fact, the property
of logic-neutrality (or pureness) is crucial to the desired foundational pluralism,
because it gives a uniform core language for a vast variety of deductive systems.
Thus, ’Balkanization’ of formal mathematics could be at least based on the same
language (although the sharing of proofs between different foundations is still
challenging).
What distinguishes Russell from Metamath:
– Expression grammar syntax rules are separated from the general logical in-
ference rules, so the grammar is guaranteed to be context free.
– The Russell proof language is more human-friendly than the Metamath proof
language.
– Russell uses a special syntactic construct for definitions, while in Metamath
definitions are simply axioms with labels, starting with ’df’ prefix.
2.2 Syntax of expressions in Metamath and Russell
The syntax of expressions in Metamath is not distinguished from the syntax of
axioms and inference rules. The latter assertions are treated differently inside
proofs, but on the syntax level there is no difference between these two kinds of
assertions.
3For example, the definition of well-formed-formula with → and ¬ logical
connectives in Metamath looks like:
${
wph $f wff ph $.
wi $a wff ( ph -> ps ) $.
$}
${
wph $f wff ph $.
wps $f wff ps $.
wi $a wff ( ph -> ps ) $.
$}
and the definition of an axiom of the Hilbert-style propositional calculus looks
like:
${
wph $f wff ph $.
wps $f wff ps $.
ax-1 $a |- ( ph -> ( ps -> ph ) ) $.
$}
Technically, one could add substantial (i.e. essential, in the Metamath terminol-
ogy) hypotheses to the syntactic grammar rules, but of course, it would make
little sense, since the common practice is to use context-free grammars for a
language.
The same syntactic rules and axioms in Russell look like:
rule wn (ph : wff) {
term : wff = # ph ;;
}
rule wi (ph : wff, ps : wff) {
term : wff = # ( ph ps ) ;;
}
axiom ax-1 (ph : wff, ps : wff) {
prop 1 : wff = |- ( ph ( ps ph ) ) ;;
}
Context-freeness here is obligatory by design.
2.3 Proof Language Syntax in Metamath and Russell
Proofs in Metamath are simply sequences of labels, which mark up assertions.
Some of them mark up syntax-forming assertions, which are actually grammar
rules, other are used to mark meaningful axiomatic or provable assertions. These
sequences form a reversed polish notation (RPN) for a program, which evalu-
ates the final expression. The proof verification procedure consists of two steps:
4computing the expression from a proof and comparing this expression with the
proposition of a proved assertion.
Thus, the only way to understand the Metamath proof is to compute it as an
RPN program, which demands a proof assistant (except for some trivial cases).
An example of the Metamath provable assertion:
${
syl.1 $e |- ( ph -> ps ) $.
syl.2 $e |- ( ps -> ch ) $.
syl $p |- ( ph -> ch ) $= .... $.
$}
${
$v ph ps ch $.
wph $f wff ph $.
wps $f wff ps $.
wch $f wff ch $.
a1d.1 $e |- ( ph -> ps ) $.
a1d $p |- ( ph -> ( ch -> ps ) ) $=
wph wps wch wps wi a1d.1 wps wch ax-1 syl $.
$}
Here the sequence
wph wps wch wps wi a1d.1 wps wch ax-1 syl
is an RPN program (Metamath proof) which produces the statement
( ph -> ( ch -> ps ) )
from the (essential, in Metamath terminology) hypothesis ( ph -> ps ). This
short proof can be understood by a human directly, but more complex proofs
demand a proof assistant, like a metamath program, which would generate the
stack trace of execution of the proof as an RPN program.
The Russell proof language instead uses a much more user-friendly declara-
tive form, in which a proof is a sequence of steps, each of which is an expres-
sion accompanied with references to the appropriate assertions and premises,
which are previously proved expressions or expressions from the premise list of
a currently proved theorem. Technically, this sequence of steps is a stack trace
obtained from executing a proof in an RPN form, which is stripped off all inter-
mediate steps related to the syntax formation. When a Russell proof is verified or
translated to Metamath, these intermediate steps are restored from the syntax
tree of an expression and unificators.
Example of the Russell proof for the same assertion:
theorem syl (ph : wff, ps : wff, ch : wff) {
hyp 1 : wff = |- ( ph -> ps ) ;;
hyp 2 : wff = |- ( ps -> ch ) ;;
-----------------------
5prop 1 : wff = |- ( ph -> ch ) ;;
}
proof of syl { ... }
theorem a1d (ph : wff, ps : wff, ch : wff) {
hyp 1 : wff = |- ( ph -> ps ) ;;
-----------------------
prop 1 : wff = |- ( ph -> ( ch -> ps ) ) ;;
}
proof of a1d {
step 1: wff = axm ax-1 () |- ( ps -> ( ch -> ps ) ) ;;
step 2: wff = thm syl (hyp 1, step 1) |- ( ph -> ( ch -> ps ) ) ;;
qed prop 1 = step 2 ;
}
Thus, the Russell proof language is natural and simple, which imposes mini-
mum restrictions and allows for user-defined grammars for expressions. Together
with the possibility to use the conventional set theory it bridges the gap between
the computer-based mathematics and the common practice mathematics from
textbooks.
2.4 Definitions in Metamath and Russell
One of the most important features of any computer-based deductive system
(framework) is safety and reliability [1]:
to what extent one can trust computer proofs ?
Reliability of a formal system is a complex subject, which involves several as-
pects. One of these aspects is the size of the axiomatic base used by a theory. If
it is large then there can be some (unintentionally) hidden inconsistency inside
of it, and if so, this will lead to the triviality of the whole theory (in case of an
explosive logic). On the other hand, if the set of the true axioms is small and
well-known (like some variant of ZF set theory) then its degree of reliability is
very high.
If each definition is introduced as a new axiom, like it is done in Metamath,
then the number of axioms increases fast as the theory grows, and at some
point there is no guarantee that all of these axioms are consistent. To address
this issue, definitions in Russell are introduced as a special syntactic construct
and certain properties are checked for each definition to ensure that adding the
underlying axiom will give a conservative extension of the theory. Conservativity
here means that if something can be proved with the help of some definition, it
can also be proved without it. This property is strictly proven, so it gives some
more certainty about correctness of Russell theories.
Example of a definition in Russell:
definition df-or (ph : wff, ps : wff) {
defiendum : wff = # ( ph \/ ps ) ;;
6definiens : wff = # ( -. ph -> ps ) ;;
-----------------------
prop : wff = |- ( defiendum <-> definiens ) ;;
}
The fact that all Russell sources can be translated back to Metamath and
checked with its original proof checker shows that Russell at least as reliable
as Metamath. Moreover, the declarative format of proofs in Russell makes it
possible for a human to do an independent verification of proofs. Of course, it
would look strange to exploit human ability of checking a formal proof in a QED
system, but still, from the philosophical point of view, human understanding is
an ultimate judge, and is very important.
3 Implementation
Currently the Russell language is implemented as a translator from / to Meta-
math and is written in c++14. The Russel repository includes test scripts, which
run a chain of translations (here abbreviation MM stands for Metamath, SMM
for simplified Metamath):
MM -> SMM -> Russell -> SMM -> MM
The translation of the whole Metamath base (about 30 000 theorems) is
rather fast in all directions. The most problematic from the performance point of
view is expression parsing in Russell. Metamath uses an explicit construction of
expressions in proofs, so it does not require any parsing or unification algorithm
when checking its source. Unlike Metamath, Russell must parse expressions in
order to get syntax trees and such parsing takes the most of time in comparison
to all other steps, like unification or translation.
One of the features implemented in the toolchain of translators is that it can
automatically divide the original Metamath source (the single file of almost 150
megabytes) into reasonably small parts following the internal layout inside the
source file. After breaking it into pieces, one can browse the source file tree with
the standard desktop navigation tools and watch source files in the standard
desktop editors without the necessity to handle a single 150 Mb file.
Russell is not considered by the author as an experimental or model lan-
guage. It is supposed to be a useful, universal, and convenient tool for all kinds
of activity in the field of formal deduction. To achieve this, the language of imple-
mentation (c++), quality of source code, efficiency of algorithms, and usefulness
to the end user are of a great importance. Russell implementation should be able
to work with hundreds of thousands of assertions in a reasonable time, which is
the subject of ongoing research and development.
4 Conclusion and Future Work
The Russell logic framework is a robust, fast, and reliable general purpose tool
for representation of formal deductive systems. The Russell language is designed
7to be simple and easy-to-learn and provides proofs in a declarative form (which
is a standard practice in informal mathematical texts).
Essentially, powerful automation is the only one blocking property left in the
list of the desirable QED features. Therefore, the next challenge is to implement
the automated proving feature so that the process of formal proof design would
be easier. The first step to making an automated proof engine for Russell has
been already taken and it showed the potential feasibility of such a goal. Since
the proof search space suffers from an extreme combinatorial explosion, some
extraordinary means are needed to cope with it. Standard techniques will not
work here, since the nature of the underlying deductive system is apriori un-
known to the prover (which is a consequence of the logic-neutrality property).
For example, in general we can not assume, that the underlying logic is cut free
(and actually it is not in the case of the Metamath theorem base).
To create a powerful prover for Russell we plan to use advanced machine
earning techniques to make the prover use the experience of the already proven
theorems. Ideally, it should be able to generate human-like proofs, formed as a
combination of previously obtained proofs.
The other important goal is to support importing of other bases of formalized
mathematics into Russell. Some successful attempts of importing HOL theorem
base into Metamath have been already undertaken [5], so there is a hope that
it would possible to join a large part of the already formalized mathematical
knowledge under a common logical framework, but with different foundations.
A more ambitious goal is to join these bases upon a common foundation.
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